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The Past, Present, and Future of Energy Regulation
Richard J. Pierce, Jr. 1
I view my role in this symposium as providing a brief overview of the history of
energy regulation in the United States over the last half century, followed by alternative
predictions of the future – one optimistic and one pessimistic. I will begin with a
description of the history of energy regulation in the hope that we can learn lessons from
history that will help us choose a promising approach for the future.
I. THE PAST
A. Oil—1960 to 2011
The US implemented poor fiscal and monetary policies in the 1960s that led to
high and rising economy-wide inflation. President Nixon responded to that problem with
economy-wide wage and price controls in 1971. 2 Wage and price controls had
devastating effects on the economy that caused them to be the subject of near universal
criticism by 1973. At that time, they were eliminated for all sectors of the economy
except oil and petroleum products.3
Several factors in addition to economy-wide inflation led to large increases in the
price of oil and petroleum products. 4 First, air quality rules implemented in the 1960s
induced many electric utilities and industrial consumers to switch from coal to oil or gas,
thereby increasing demand for oil. Second, the US position on the 1973 Arab-Israeli war
led the Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to
impose an embargo on exports of oil to the US for several months. That embargo
produced shortages and increases in the price of petroleum products in the US. More
important, the success of the embargo suggested to all members of OPEC that they could
increase their wealth by withholding supplies from the market and thereby increasing the
global price of oil. They began to do so, with a resulting four-fold increase in the price of
oil.
The US responded to this sequence of events by retaining price controls on oil and
petroleum products when it eliminated economy-wide price controls in 1973. The US
imposed oil price controls continuously until 1981. Their effects included long lines at
gas stations, implementation of a complicated rationing system, cross-subsidization of
imports, increased dependence on imported oil, an increased global price of oil, and lots
of work for lawyers. 5 In 1981, President Reagan deregulated the price of oil and
petroleum products. 6 With cross-subsidies of imports eliminated, the price of oil declined
1
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significantly. 7 The oil market has performed well since, and OPEC has little power to
increase price artificially by withholding supplies today.
B. Natural Gas—1960 to 2011
In 1954, a five-Justice majority of the Supreme Court held that the Federal Power
Commission (FPC) was required to regulate the wellhead price of natural gas. 8 FPC
began to impose price controls in the 1960s. 9 By the late 1960s, air quality rules had
increased demand for gas by encouraging switching from coal to oil or gas, and price
controls had reduced the supply of gas. The result was a shortage that grew through the
1970s. 10 The effects of the price controls and the shortage included millions of people out
of work due to factory closings, cross-subsidization of imports, an increased global price
of gas, implementation of a complicated rationing system, and lots of work for lawyers.
Congress responded by enacting the Natural Gas Policy Act of 197811 (NGPA)—
a statute that divided gas supplies into 23 categories, each subject to a different price
ceiling. NGPA created a combination of conditions that most economists previously
believed to be impossible – a surplus of gas combined with above market prices for many
types of gas. 12 NGPA also created a situation in which the artificially low regulated price
of “old” domestic gas cross-subsidized “high cost gas” and imported gas. Gas in those
categories sold for prices two to four times the market price of gas.
Beginning in 1985, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), FPC’s
successor, issued a series of orders in which it: (1) deintegrated the gas market vertically,
separating the natural monopoly functions from the structurally competitive functions; (2)
subjected the structurally competitive wholesale gas market to unregulated competition;
and, (3) imposed a common carrier form of regulation on the natural monopoly gas
transportation function. 13 With competition in place and cross-subsidies eliminated, the
price of gas declined significantly. 14 The gas market has performed well since.
Over the period 2007-2011, gas producers have combined two traditional
practices—horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing of shale formations--with excellent
results. The supply of gas has increased significantly, with a large resulting decrease in
price. 15 Gas is now less than half the price of oil.16 Concern that some chemicals used in
hydraulic fracturing are having adverse effects on water quality has resulted in pressure
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to increase regulation of hydraulic fracturing, however. 17 It seems clear that regulation
will (and should) increase to some uncertain extent with some uncertain resulting
increase in cost and, hence, in the price of gas.
C. Electricity—1960-2011
Air quality rules implemented in the 1960s encouraged utilities to install
expensive pollution control technologies, to switch from coal to gas, and to begin
construction of 200 nuclear generating plants. Economy-wide inflation combined with
fuel switching and pollution controls to increase significantly the cost of generating
electricity. 18
The oil and gas shortages of the 1970s and a desire to achieve energy
independence induced Congress to enact two statutes in 1978. The Powerplant and
Industrial Fuel Use Act (PIFUA) 19 required utilities and industrial consumers to switch
from oil and gas to coal, and prohibited electric utilities from constructing new generating
plants that were designed to burn oil or gas. 20 Congress repealed PIFUA in 1987. 21 By
then it was a counterproductive anachronism. The government-created shortages of oil
and gas that had inspired enactment of the statute were long gone, 22 and it seemed silly to
require utilities to rely exclusively on the dirtiest fuel, coal, when they had access to
abundant, clean, and inexpensive natural gas.
The second statute Congress enacted in 1978 was the Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act (PURPA). 23 It encouraged utilities to buy electricity from non-utility
generators (NUGS) at above market prices if the NUG used specified preferred
technologies that included cogeneration and low head hydro, and it encouraged utilities to
use customer funds to make purchases, such as insulation, high efficiency light bulbs, and
high efficiency appliances, that were designed to increase their customers’ energy
efficiency. 24 Some states, primarily California and the northeastern states, required
utilities to enter into long-term contracts to purchase large quantities of electricity from
NUGs at prices far above market and rewarded utilities for using their customer’s money
to make large energy efficiency purchases on behalf of their customers. 25
The unit price of electricity increased significantly as a result of: (1) economywide inflation; (2) higher costs of fuel and pollution controls; (3) higher than expected
costs of constructing nuclear generating plants; (4) methods of regulation used to reflect
17
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the cost of new plants in prices that overstated the cost of those plants; and, (5) a decline
in demand caused partly by the increased price of electricity and partly by an economic
downturn. 26 The price of electricity increased most in the states that required utilities to
buy a lot of electricity from NUGs at above market prices and that rewarded utilities that
used large quantities of their customers’ money to make efficiency purchases on their
behalf. The price of electricity was almost twice as high in those states as in the states
that did not take those actions. 27
The increased price of electricity produced a consumer backlash that was
particularly strong in the states with the highest electricity prices. State regulators used a
variety of regulatory doctrines to disallow over 100 billion dollars in investments in
cancelled or completed nuclear generating plants. 28 100 plants were completed, while
another 100 partially completed plants were cancelled. No utility has been willing to
invest in a new nuclear generating plant since the investment disallowances of the 1980s.
The large increases in the price of electricity also provided the impetus to attempt
to restructure the electricity market in a manner similar to the successful restructuring of
the gas market in the 1980s – vertical deintegration of structurally-competitive functions
from monopoly functions, imposition of deregulated competition on the structurallycompetitive wholesale market, and imposition of common carrier type regulation on the
monopolistic transmission function. 29 FERC initiated such a restructuring effort in
1996. 30
After years of halting progress, FERC abandoned its attempt to restructure the
electricity market. The failure of that restructuring effort was attributable to many factors,
including: (1) inadequate FERC jurisdiction; (2) the fragmented corporate structure of the
utility industry; (3) resistance from some states that wanted to retain complete control
over their utilities and from some utilities that did not want to confront competition; (4)
low short term price elasticity of demand coupled with inability to store electricity; (5)
serious errors made by FERC and by many states; (6) the combination of extraordinarily
high prices and intermittent blackouts experienced in California in 2000-2001; and, (7)
the 2001 scandal involving the misconduct and ultimate demise of Enron, the largest
participant in the nascent competitive electricity market. 31
II. THE PRESENT AND FUTURE
At present, we are focused primarily on use of energy regulation to pursue two
goals—energy independence and mitigation of global warming. We are relying mainly on
26
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three tools to pursue those goals—subsidies for domestic carbon-free sources of energy,
mandates to electric utilities to increase the per cent of total electricity they generate from
carbon-free fuels, and novel uses of the Clean Air Act (CAA).
I see two potential future courses of action—continuation of the status quo and
substitution of a large carbon tax for the tools we are now attempting to use. Continuation
of the status quo will produce a lot of work for lawyers but poor results for the nation and
the world. By contrast, we can maximize the efficacy and efficiency of our efforts if we
drop one of our goals—energy independence—and substitute a large carbon tax for the
expensive and ineffective tools we are now using in an effort to mitigate global warming.
A. We Should Pursue Only the Goal of Mitigation of Global Warming
It makes no sense to pursue energy independence as a goal. 32 Any effective effort
to replace all foreign sources of energy with domestic sources would cost trillions of
dollars, with little, if any beneficial effects. We are dependent on foreign sources of many
important goods. There is no more reason to be concerned about our dependence on
foreign sources of energy than to be concerned about our dependence on foreign sources
of myriad other important resources.
Lithium is a particularly good example of a resource that is critical to the nation’s
future and that is, or should be, of greater concern than energy. 33 Lithium is critical to
any effort to manufacture efficient batteries. That, in turn, is critical to our ability to
improve the efficiency with which we generate and consume electricity. The US
produces only a tiny fraction of the lithium we use. Most of the world’s lithium supply is
in Bolivia 34 —a country with an unstable anti-american government and an economy
based primarily on cocaine. 35 By contrast, the largest sources of US energy imports by
far are our neighbors, Canada and Mexico, and we are much less dependent on foreign
sources of energy than on foreign sources of lithium. 36
Some people maintain that we could reduce threats to our national security and/or
our level of defense spending if we attained energy independence. There is no evidence
to support that widely held view, and it is inconsistent with a quick survey of the major
threats that now concern us. We import no energy from the any of the five countries that
are of greatest concern to us today--North Korea, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, or China.
Indeed, four of the five are themselves dependent on foreign sources of energy, and even
Iran must import large quantities of gasoline every year. Reducing our dependence on
Canada and Mexico as our primary suppliers of energy would have no effect whatsoever
on the potential threats to our national security posed by North Korea, Afghanistan,
Pakistan, Iran, or China or on our need to devote large sums to national defense.
32
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By contrast, there is overwhelming evidence that global warming will have
catastrophic effects, including the death of millions of people and the displacement of
hundreds of millions of people, primarily in impoverished areas like central Africa,
central India, Bangladesh and coastal Indonesia. 37 There is also persuasive evidence that
global warming can be mitigated by reducing global emissions of green house gases
(ghg), including carbon dioxide (CO2), the most ubiquitous ghg. We should continue to
embrace mitigation of global warming as an important goal of energy policy.
We can simplify greatly our choice of means to pursue our goals if we drop
pursuit of the ill-conceived goal of energy independence and pursue only the goal of
mitigation of global warming. As long as we continue to attempt to pursue both goals
simultaneously, we will be forced to make tradeoffs that sacrifice one goal to further the
other. Thus, for instance, President Carter’s expensive and ill-fated attempt to obtain
energy independence relied heavily on maximum substitution of coal for oil and gas. 38
That is a terrible policy from a global warming perspective. Use of coal results in twice
as much emissions of CO2 as use of natural gas and about fifty per cent more emissions
than use of oil. Our present policy of providing massive subsidies for use of corn-based
ethanol to replace gasoline is even worse from a global warming perspective. Substitution
of corn-based ethanol for gasoline induces increases in deforestation to create land that
can be used to cultivate corn and other food crops. 39 When the effects of those land use
changes are added to the CO2 emissions that result from the process of growing corn and
converting it into ethanol, 40 substituting corn-based ethanol for gasoline has effects on
global warming that are even worse than the effects of substituting coal for petroleum
products.
B. We Should Replace Our Present Tools With a Carbon Tax
Once we focus on the single goal of mitigation of global warming, we can
identify and implement ways of taking the most important step to further that goal—
reduction of CO2 emissions by at least 80% by 2050. The present mix of tools we are
using to further that goal are expensive, ineffective, and unsustainable. The Supreme
Court has provided the foundation for EPA to use the CAA to reduce CO2 emissions,41
and the Obama Administration has taken a few modest steps in that direction, 42 but there
is a broad consensus that CAA is poorly designed to reduce CO2 emissions. In the
context of the other pollutants EPA has regulated, it was possible to install pollution
control devices that reduced emissions produced by use of hydrocarbons significantly
while continuing to consume the fuels. That is not an option in the case of CO2. It is an
37
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inevitable by product of the process of using hydrocarbons. EPA can reduce CO2
emissions only by reducing use of hydrocarbons. It is not clear how EPA could
accomplish that result. The CAA is not designed to accomplish a result of that type.
Subsidies for carbon-free domestic fuels are extremely expensive, largely
ineffective, and ultimately unsustainable. The subsidies needed to induce enough
substitution of carbon-free fuels to reduce CO2 emissions by 80 per cent are enormous.
Thus, for instance, since energy from windmills is almost twice as expensive as energy
from coal or gas, wind farms would have to be assured of subsidies equal to the current
price of coal or gas, while producers of solar energy would have to be assured of
subsidies equal to three to four times the current price of coal or gas in order to induce
large scale switching to carbon-free fuels. 43 We simply cannot afford carbon-free fuel
subsidies of that magnitude.
Mandates to electric utilities to add enough carbon-free generation to mitigate
global warming would be equally expensive, but the cost would be borne by consumers.
The average price of electricity would increase significantly if utilities engaged in the
massive fuel switching needed to reduce CO2 emissions by 80 per cent. Of course,
consumers would revolt long before mandates could accomplish that result. More modest
increases in the price of electricity spawned a consumer revolt in the 1970s and 1980s. 44
There has long been a broad consensus that the massive reductions in CO2
emissions needed to mitigate global warming can be attained through only one of two
means – a global cap and trade system or a large global carbon tax. 45 The failure of the
Copenhagen meeting has left even many of the strongest proponents of a cap and trade
system in despair. 46 It seems highly unlikely that an effective global cap and trade system
can be designed and implemented. That leaves a large carbon tax as the only potentially
viable means of mitigating global warming.
Given the present political climate, it is hard to imagine the US adopting a large
carbon tax. Democrats are unwilling to increase any taxes on people who earn less than
$250,000 per year, while Republicans are unwilling to increase any taxes on anyone.47
That aspect of the political environment must change in the near future, however, if the
US is to avoid the fate of Greece. Unless we make major changes in fiscal policy, we will
experience large deficits for the indefinite future.48 Deficits of that magnitude are
unsustainable. 49 At some point in the near future, we must reduce spending and increase
taxes.
A carbon tax is superior to an increase in income taxes or a value-added tax—the
only alternatives to a carbon tax that offer the prospect of increasing revenues to the point
43
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at which our budget deficit will be tolerable. Taxes discourage the taxed activity. Thus,
income taxes discourage work, while a value added tax discourages purchases of all types
of goods and services. By contrast, a carbon tax discourages only what we need to
discourage to mitigate global warming – emissions of CO2.
A carbon tax is superior to subsidies for carbon-free energy sources in two
important respects. First, it has the opposite effect on the budget deficit. While subsidies
increase the deficit, a carbon tax would decrease the deficit. Second, it is much easier to
design and to implement. To be effective, a carbon tax need only deter consumption of
hydrocarbons. Consumers are left with complete discretion with respect to the ways in
which they reduce their consumption of hydrocarbons, e.g., by increasing the efficiency
of their use of energy or by substituting for hydrocarbons some mix of carbon-free fuels
like wind power, solar power, or nuclear power. It is important to give consumers that
flexibility, both because the alternatives will be more or less attractive to different
consumers in a variety of different situations and because we cannot predict which of the
alternatives to hydrocarbons will become more attractive in the future as a result of
technological breakthroughs. By contrast, subsidies must be set at levels that are adequate
to encourage optimal substitution of each subsidized alternative. By definition, they are
always too high or too low, both because of the varying circumstances of consumers and
because of the dynamic and unpredictable pace of technological progress.
1. Will a Carbon Tax Be Effective?
I am confident that a large carbon tax is the best policy the US can implement in
an effort to mitigate global warming. I am less confident, however, that a carbon tax
implemented by the US will be effective in mitigating global warming, given the
daunting nature of the task. The climate experts tell us that we must reduce global CO2
emissions by 80% by 2050. I am skeptical that there is anything the US can do that can
accomplish that result. My skepticism has two sources – the likely behavior of some
other countries and the extreme difficulty of meeting this goal even in the US.
It is reasonable to assume that most other developed countries, e.g., the members
of the EU and Japan, would join the US in an effort to reduce their CO2 emissions by
80%, but it is not realistic to make such an assumption with respect to most developing
countries, e.g., China, India, and Russia. If the developed countries reduce their CO2
emissions by reducing their consumption of hydrocarbons, developing countries are
likely to increase their emissions by increasing their consumption of hydrocarbons. Any
significant reduction in the quantity of hydrocarbons consumed in developed countries
will reduce the global price of hydrocarbons. That, in turn, will yield increased
consumption of hydrocarbons in the developing countries that already account for almost
all of the increases in global CO2 emissions in recent years.
The extent to which increased hydrocarbon consumption and increased CO2
emissions in developing countries will offset decreased hydrocarbon consumption and
decreased CO2 emissions in develop countries will depend on the price elasticity of
demand for hydrocarbons in developing countries over the next forty years. Estimates of
that metric range from 29% to 70%,50 so increased emissions in developing countries will
50
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offset about one-half of the decreased emissions in developed countries unless
developing countries impose meaningful limits on their emissions. That is why efforts
must continue to implement an international agreement that imposes meaningful limits of
some type on the emissions of ghgs in developing countries.51 Without such limits,
nothing the US does is likely to be effective in mitigating global warming.
Even a US effort to reduce our CO2 emissions by 80% would be extremely
expensive and time-consuming. It also would produce adverse effects on the environment
of uncertain magnitude. To illustrate the difficulty of the task, I will describe briefly each
of the potential steps the US might take to reduce CO2 emissions in the electricity sector
by 80% and a few of the obstacles to implementation of each of those steps.
The electricity sector accounts for forty per cent of US emissions of CO2. 52 The
present composition of our sources of electricity are: 46% coal; 21% gas; 20% nuclear;
2% oil; 7% hydropower, and 4% other renewable. 53 Since coal consumption produces
twice as much CO2 emissions as gas consumption, we would need to eliminate
completely all emissions attributable to coal to reach the goal of an 80% reduction in
CO2 emissions in the electricity sector. That statistic illustrates a major political obstacle.
Coal is mined throughout Appalachia and the Powder River Basin. Any effort to
eliminate coal mining through any means will face strong opposition from the many
members of the House and Senate who represent states and districts in which coal
accounts for a significant part of the economy. There are many paths we can take to move
toward elimination of CO2 emissions from use of coal in generating plants, but there are
many obstacles on each of those paths. I will begin by describing the generic obstacles to
the kinds of changes we need to make to reduce CO2 emissions from electricity
generation by 80%.
First, all carbon-free sources of electricity are more expensive than coal or gas. 54
Thus, inducing consumers to switch sources will require either large subsidies or a large
carbon tax. Second, electricity cannot be stored economically. That is important because
some of the carbon-free sources of electricity are unpredictable in their availability. Thus,
for instance, wind power is available only when the wind velocity falls within a particular
range, and solar power is available only when the sun shines. This characteristic would be
much less important if we could generate electricity in one period, store it economically,
and consume it in another period. Since electricity cannot be stored economically, we can
add only a modest amount of wind or solar energy to the grid without significantly
impairing reliability. 55 Third, the US has traditionally relied on state and local
governments to regulate the most important activities that are needed to generate,
transmit, and distribute electricity. Some state and local governments are not likely to
share the national government’s interests in taking the actions needed to mitigate global
warming, and even those that do are likely to have divergent preferences with respect to
the best means to further that goal. No national plan to mitigate global warming can
51
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succeed if California and Oklahoma are free to adopt different policies with respect to the
actions needed to mitigate global warming. 56 Fourth, increased reliance on carbon-free
sources like wind or solar will require large additions to our transmission grid. Most such
additions provoke strong opposition on aesthetic grounds, 57 and there is an ongoing
controversy over the manner in which such expansions should be financed. 58 Fifth, the
US is extremely litigious. Most of the projects needed to mitigate global warming will
provoke opposition at regulatory agencies and in courts. The resulting litigation will slow
the rate at which we can achieve the mitigation goal and increase the cost of achieving
that goal.
a. Conservation
Turning to particular steps that can be taken to mitigate global warming, I will
begin with the step most people believe to be the most promising –
conservation/increased efficiency of use. Price is the most reliable and effective means of
encouraging conservation and increased efficiency. If consumers confront electricity
prices that reflect accurately the cost of electricity, including external costs like those
attributable to global warming, they will decrease their consumption of electricity and
increase the efficiency with which they use electricity. A large carbon tax would move
the price of electricity in the right direction, but it is not enough.
Demand for electricity varies greatly over time. Since electricity cannot be stored
economically, that widely varying demand must be met with contemporaneous variations
in supply. The cost of supplying a kilowatt hour (kwh) of electricity to a particular
location can vary by as much as a factor of twenty to one depending on the time when the
electricity is supplied. Yet, most consumers pay a price for each kwh that does not vary
as the cost of a kwh goes up or down. We can encourage consumers to engage in optimal
efforts at conservation and efficiency enhancement only by changing the methods used to
bill consumers. To accomplish that goal, we must install smart meters for all consumers.
Smart meters allow consumers and utilities to observe the constantly changing cost of
electricity and to measure consumption at each cost level. Smart meters will have no
effect, however, unless we also change the method of billing all consumers so that the
price they pay for each kwh varies greatly depending on the constantly changing cost of
meeting their demand for electricity.
The federal government is attempting to implement a smart grid that would
include smart meters and new billing methods. It lacks the power to make the needed
changes, however. Both the decision whether to authorize a utility to install smart meters
and the decision to change the method of billing consumers is subject to state regulation.
The federal efforts to implement a smart grid have made little progress because many
consumer advocacy groups and state regulators have objected on a wide variety of
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grounds. 59 Unless consumer advocacy groups or state regulators change their attitudes
dramatically or Congress gives the federal government the power to require installation
of smart meters and changes in billing methods and the federal government exercises that
power, the highly touted attempt to install a smart grid will go nowhere.
Some people believe that price provides an inadequate incentive for consumers to
conserve because of various imperfections in the market.60 In order to overcome those
imperfections, they urge adoption of state regulatory systems that reward utilities for
using their customers’ funds to make large payments for energy conservation purposes on
behalf of their customers. Under a system of this type, a utility would pay for additional
home insulation, high efficiency light bulbs, and high efficiency appliances, and add the
cost of those acquisitions, plus a reward for their conservation-enhancing efforts, to their
customers’ bills.
Several states implemented regulatory systems of this type in the late 1970s and
early 1980s with unfortunate effects. 61 The new systems replaced one arguable market
imperfection with another—utilities that are rewarded for making purchases on behalf of
their customers do not have an incentive to insure that the purchases are cost effective.
Audits of the customer-funded conservation acquisition programs consistently found that
the efficiency enhancing claims for the goods and services purchased by the utilities were
overstated. Ultimately, all of the state agencies that authorized programs of that type were
forced by consumer backlash to abandon them.
b. Switching to Natural Gas
We can achieve some part of our global warming mitigation goal by encouraging
utilities to switch from coal to gas. At present, gas is available in abundance at about the
same price as coal, and it emits only half as much CO2 as coal per kwh of electricity
produced. There are limits on our ability to use switching to gas as a mitigation strategy,
however. In the short term, only about ten per cent of generating capacity that uses coal
can switch to gas. Over a longer period, of course, we could substitute gas for all of our
present coal capacity. It is highly likely, however, that the price of gas will increase,
perhaps significantly, as a result of increased regulation of hydraulic fracturing and
increased demand attributable to fuel switching. Moreover, even a complete replacement
of coal with gas would decrease emissions of CO2 attributable to electricity generation
by only about 45%--far short of the 80% needed to mitigate global warming.
c. Switching to Nuclear
We could pursue a strategy of switching from coal to nuclear. The obstacles to
success in pursuing that strategy include: nuclear energy is about 20% more expensive
than coal or gas; 62 nuclear is controversial with the public; we have made no progress in
solving the permanent nuclear waste disposal problem; nuclear generating plants are
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difficult to finance; and prospective investors remember the $100 billion dollars in losses
investors in nuclear plants suffered in the 1980s. 63
d. Switching to Hydro
We could pursue a strategy of switching from coal to hydro power. The obstacles
to success in pursuing that strategy include: hydro is about 20% more expensive than coal
or gas; 64 the US has limited untapped hydro potential; and hydro has become unpopular
with the public because of the effects of dams on fisheries resources.
e. Switching to Geothermal
We could pursue a strategy of switching from coal to geothermal. The obstacles to
success in pursuing that strategy include: geothermal is about 16% more expensive than
coal or gas; 65 there are limited viable sites and many are in environmentally sensitive
areas such as Yellowstone National Park; geothermal induces category 3 plus
earthquakes; earthquakes closed the large geothermal project in Basel, 66 resulted in the
criminal indictment of the Basel project manager, forced cancellation of a large project in
California, 67 and created serious NIMBY problems for any potential geothermal project
in the US.
F. Switching to Wind
We could pursue a strategy of switching from coal to wind. The obstacles to
success in pursuing that strategy include: wind is 50-90% more expensive than coal or
gas; wind farms kill large numbers of birds and bats; 68 wind farms raise serious issues
under the Endangered Species Act; 69 windmills are extremely noisy; wind farms are
aesthetically controversial; windmills are low load factor; it takes about 1000 windmills
to equal the output of one standard-sized generator; wind power is unreliable because its
availability depends on wind velocity; and because of its unreliability and low load
factor, wind power requires construction of a disproportionately large number of new
transmission lines.
G. Switching to Solar
We could pursue a strategy of switching from coal to one of two forms of solar
energy – central station thermal or decentralized photovoltaic. The obstacles to success in
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pursuing a solar thermal policy include: solar thermal is about 160% more expensive than
coal or gas; 70 it is unreliable because it is available only when the sun shines; it requires
new transmission lines; and it requires a large amount of land that is rendered useless for
any other purpose. The obstacles to success in pursuing decentralized photovoltaic
include: photovoltaic is about 300% more expensive than coal or gas; 71 it requires states
to approve feed in tariffs to allow solar producers to sell their excess electricity to the grid
at generous prices; it is unpopular with many zoning boards and neighborhood
associations; 72 and it is unreliable because it is available only when the sun shines.
F. Switching to Clean Coal
We could pursue a strategy of switching from coal to “clean coal” by
implementing a program of carbon capture and storage (ccs). The obstacles to success in
pursuing that strategy include: it has never been done on a large-scale basis; it would
increase the cost of generating with coal by about 30%; 73 it would take decades to
construct the required pipeline network and underground storage caverns; safe storage of
CO2 may be more difficult and risky than safe storage of spent nuclear fuel; a CO2 leak
in Cameroon killed 1700 people in 1986; 74 public awareness of the risks of CO2 storage
will cause major NIMBY problems; and no one will embark on such a project without
federal legislation that limits the project sponsor’s liability in the event of a catastrophic
leak.
CONCLUSION
I hope that my description of the limited options available to us to reduce CO2
emissions by 80% and the formidable obstacles to success in attaining that goal persuade
you both that the task is daunting and that a large carbon tax provides the best prospect
for success in attaining the goal. A large carbon tax would offset to some extent the
difference between the cost of continuing to rely primarily on hydrocarbons to generate
electricity and the cost of switching to primary reliance on carbon-free sources of
electricity. It also would spur investment in the research and development needed to
enhance the efficiency with which we use electricity, reduce the cost of using carbon-free
sources, improve the reliability of sources like wind and solar, and develop methods of
storing electricity at tolerable cost. Perhaps most important, it would leave producers and
consumers free to take advantage of the options that evolve as best for them given the
high variability of their circumstances and the uncertain pace of technological progress in
taking the steps needed to mitigate global warming.
Our only hope of mitigating global warming lies in major technological
breakthroughs. With the economic incentives created by a large carbon tax, we are likely
to attain significant improvements in the technology needed to mitigate global warming.
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It is impossible to predict, however, whether the major advances will take place in the
context of conservation/enhanced efficiency, reduced costs and/or increased reliability of
specific carbon-free sources, or improved ability to store electricity economically. If we
implement a large carbon tax, we do not have to engage in the hazardous process of
predicting technological advances. If they take place primarily in the context of solar
power, the tax will automatically channel most of our mitigation efforts in that direction.
Conversely, if they take place primarily in the context of some other source, such as
conservation/efficiency enhancement, cost of storage, wind, geothermal, clean coal, or
nuclear, the tax will automatically channel most of our efforts down whatever path has
become the most economic route to mitigate global warming.
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